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24 
Directly Plausible Principles 
Howard Nye 
In this chapter I defend a methodological view about how we should conduct 
substantive ethical inquiries in the fields of normative and practical ethics. I 
maintain that the direct plausibility and implausibility of general ethical prin-
ciples - once fully clarified and understood - should be foundational in our 
substantive ethical reasoning. I argue that, in order to expose our ethical intui-
tions about particular cases to maximal critical scrutiny, we must determine 
whether they can be justified by directly plausible principles. To expose appar-
ently plausible principles to maximal critical scrutiny, we must determine 
whether their direct plausibility can survive careful clarification of what they 
are really saying. This means that intuitions about cases are useful only in 
(a) suggesting principles that must stand on their own two feet, and (b) illus-
trating or otherwise helping us clarify what a principle is really saying. We 
should not reject principles that seem most directly plausible after we have 
fully clarified their content simply because they conflict with our intuitions 
about cases, because to do so is to side with uncritical prejudices over the teach-
ings of critical scrutiny. 
1 Principles and cases 
We often find ourselves unsure about, or in disagreement concerning, the 
answers to important ethical questions. Familiar examples include ques-
tions about the moral permissibility of various cases of abortion, euthanasia, 
military action, conduct towards non-human animals, and omitting to help 
the global poor. In some cases our uncertainties and disagreements are pri-
marily empirical, and may be resolved by gathering or more carefully evalu-
ating empirical evidence such as that concerning the nature of fetal and 
non-human animal psychology, the effectiveness of palliative care, the risks 
of harm to civilians, and the effects of contributing to aid organizations. 
But in many cases our uncertainties and disagreements trace to basic ethical 
610 
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uncertainties and disagreements. We may agree about (or stipulate) all of the 
merely descriptive features of the foregoing kinds of conduct, but still find 
ourselves uncertain about or in disagreement concerning whether they are 
permissible. 
When we are faced with such basic ethical uncertainties and disagreements, 
there are two very natural things we do in attempting to reason our way to a 
resolution. First, we search for ethical principles - which seem plausible to our-
selves and our opponents - that seem to support a specific answer. For instance, 
those arguing that abortion is impermissible might adduce the plausible prin-
ciple that it is wrong to kill innocent human beings, and those arguing that 
it is permissible might adduce the plausible principle that people have a right 
to control their own bodies. Second, in the course of evaluating these princi-
ples and their applicability to the case at hand, we think about their implica-
tions for other cases, which may seem intuitive or counterintuitive to ourselves 
and our opponents. For instance, to support the claim that considerations of 
bodily autonomy can sometimes justify killing innocent human beings, Judith 
Thomson (1971, 48-9) asked us to consider the case of finding one's kidneys 
connected to a famous violinist, where disconnecting from him any time 
in the next nine months will cause him to die. If it seems to us permissible 
to disconnect from the violinist in such a case, this appears to give us some 
reason to doubt that what truth there is in the claim that it is wrong to kill 
innocent human beings entails that abortion - at least in cases of rape - is 
impermissible. 
In the course of further evaluating such principles and verdicts about cases, 
we are often led to consider principles of greater generality, which may concern 
related ethical domains. For instance, many of those who are inclined to 
think that abortion is typically wrong even in cases of rape are inclined to 
think it permissible to abort ectopic pregnancies, which will otherwise kill 
both the mother and the developing fetus. They may also be inclined to think 
that it would be morally wrong to kill innocent beings who are not human 
but psychologically identical to humans - like extraterrestrials portrayed in 
unrealistic science fiction. This may incline them to doubt that the ethical 
relevance of the fact that an act will kill an innocent human being is fun-
damental or underivative. Rather, it may be plausibly seen as at least largely 
derived from the harm it does to the being by depriving her of future goods, 
together with a general principle of non-maleficence according to which there 
are weighty moral reasons against inflicting harm (cf. Marquis 1989, 189-92). 
If this is what determines the strength of the objection to killing - particu-
larly in cases where death cannot frustrate the victim's autonomously chosen 
ends - then the moral reasons against an abortion may depend crucially on 
the extent to which death deprives the fetus of goods that otherwise would 
have counted ethically as hers. To determine this, we must consider principles 
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about what matters in survival - whether these are certain psychological rela-
tions (Shoemaker 1963; Parfit 1984), certain physical relations (Williams 1970; 
Marquis 1989), or certain combinations of the two (Unger 1990; McMahan 
2002). Especially in cases of fetuses whose later lives may be atypical, such as 
those with intellectual disabilities, we may also need to consider principles 
about what makes life more or less of a benefit - whether this is determined 
by the balance of enjoyment over misery (Bentham 1789; Sidgwick 1907), or 
in part the extent to which one's experiences and activities are cognitively 
I AQJ I sophisticated (Mill 1861, McMahan 2002). 
In this way, the enterprise of practical or applied ethics, which seeks to 
resolve our uncertainties and disagreements about concrete ethical issues, 
blends seamlessly into that of normative ethics, which works to determine the 
most general basic ethical facts there are about what falls under our various 
ethical categories.1 Most philosophers working in the fields of practical and 
normative ethics use some version of our natural methods of ethical reasoning, 
adducing and evaluating both plausible ethical principles and intuitions about 
particular cases. But there are crucial differences in the specific ways they 
reason about cases and principles. Moreover, there are radical anti-theorists who 
eschew any basic role for principles in our ethical reasoning (see for instance 
Dancy 2004, 2013). 
In this chapter I defend a particular methodological approach to substantive 
ethical reasoning. Let us say that a general ethical idea or principle is directly 
plausible if it seems true considered simply by itself - in the sense of inde-
pendent of its inferential relations, such as what else it entails and what else 
entails it. Many would call such appearances of the direct plausibility of prin-
ciples intuitions that they are true (see for instance Huemer 2005; Singer 2005; 
Sandberg and Juth 2011). Unfortunately the term 'intuition' has become so 
associated with directly compelling propositions about particular cases that, 
simply to avoid confusion, 1 will speak of finding a principle directly plausible 
instead of having the intuition that it is true. 
The methodological approach I defend maintains that the direct plausibility 
or implausibility of principles about the ethical relevance of various factors 
is foundational in normative and practical ethics. This does not mean that 
appearances of direct plausibility are infallible. Principles often seem plausible 
only because we are making confusions and do not fully appreciate what they 
are really saying. On the approach I defend, much of the business of ethical 
reasoning consists in correcting erroneous appearances of plausibility by clari-
fying the content of principles, making crucial distindions, and discovering 
alternatives with greater direct plausibility. Nor does the claim that the direct 
plausibility of principles is foundational mean that we should begin our ethical 
reasoning by considering only which principles seem plausible. The princi-
ples that turn out to be most plausible on reflection might be suggested to 
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us only by first considering our intuitions about a variety of cases and then 
seeing which of them can be justified by principles that, once formulated and 
clarified, are directly plausible. 
What this claim that the direct plausibility of principles is foundational does 
mean is that: 
1 The ultimate way to determine whether a basic ethical judgment is correct 
is to determine whether it can be subsumed under defensible ethical 
principles, 
2 An ethical principle is defensible if it is either derived from or a member of 
a defensible set of axiomatic or fundamental ethical principles, and 
3 The ultimate way of determining whether a set of fundamental ethical prin-
ciples is defensible is by determining whether, after careful clarification of 
their contents, they are more directly plausible than all rival candidate sets 
of fundamental ethical principles. 
On this view intuitions about cases can be useful in ethical reasoning, but 
only by (a) suggesting principles that must stand on their own two feet as 
independently plausible, and (b) illustrating or otherwise helping us clarify 
what a principle is really saying. The mere fact that a principle conflicts with 
our intuitions about cases is never in itself a reason to reject it. In this respect 
the approach differs from both that of radical anti-theory and many philoso-
phers who recognize the importance of both cases and principles in ethical 
reasoning. 
This was, I believe, the approach of both Henry Sidgwick and W.D. Ross, 
although they differed significantly in their views about the scope and deter-
minacy of the most general ethical principles that remain directly plausible 
after they have been fu!Jy clarified and understood. 2 Ross and some other 
early 201h century subscribers to this approach seemed to think that it jus-
tified commonsense ethical opinions. But I believe that the revolutionary 
potential of the approach was clearly demonstrated in the early 1970s (as befits 
revolutionary potential), in Peter Singer's groundbreaking works on "Famine, 
Affluence, and Morality" (1972), "All Animals are Equal" (1974b), and Animal 
Liberation (1975). 
My contention below is that, in order to expose our ethical judgments to 
maximal critical scrutiny, we must treat the direct plausibility and implaus-
ibility of principles as foundational. To expose intuitions about particular cases 
[henceforth 'case-intuitions' or just 'intuitions'] to maximal critical scrutiny, 
we must determine whether they can be justified by directly plausible princi-
ples. To expose apparently plausible principles to maximal critical scrutiny, 
we must determine whether their direct plausibility can survive careful clari-
fication of what the principles are really saying, and whether they can be 
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integrated with other such principles to form a maximally plausible set. But 
maximally critical methods will not allow us to reject principles that seem 
most directly plausible after we have fully clarified their content and that of 
their rivals simply because they do not fit our case-intuitions. To reject such 
principles for the sake of intuitions is to side with our uncritical prejudices over 
the teachings of critical scrutiny. 
2 The insufficiency of considering cases and the relevance of 
factors in cases 
If all we had to go on were our initial case-intuitions, then reasoning in the 
service of resolving basic ethical uncertainties and disagreements would seem 
impossible. If there were no ethical regularities, and each judgment had to 
be made on a case-by-case basis, then what we thought about one case could 
have no rational bearing on what we should think about any other. We would, 
for instance, have to dismiss both the intuitive impermissibility of killing 
older children who were conceived by rape and the intuitive permissibility 
of unplugging from Thomson's violinist as entirely irrelevant to the morality 
of abortion in cases of rape. If there were absolutely no regularities in how 
the features of various cases operated in determining their ethical status, we 
could not know whether such factors as depriving of someone of all future 
goods or controlling one's body so as to avoid a substantial burden played 
anything like the same role in determining whether such abortions are per-
missible. Consequently, if our initial case-intuitions about such an abortion 
were uncertain or in disagreement, we would seem to have no rational means 
to resolve this uncertainty or disagreement. 
Radical anti-theorists seek ways of going beyond our initial case-intuitions 
without appealing to explicit principles that might connect our thinking about 
one case to our thinking about another. Their main suggestion is that we 
should seek to gain - or defer to individuals who have - more of a certain kind 
of experience or ability. Dancy (2004, 2013), for instance, suggests that the 
experience we should seek to gain and trust in the course of ethical reasoning 
is that of considering many similar cases. Surely this is sound advice. Ethical 
views that result from considering many related cases instead of just a few seem 
more critica1Iy informed. In practice, this method of exposing our initial case-
intuitions to the simple scrutiny of related cases may suffice to resolve many 
uncertainties and disagreements. 
Still, this "method of more cases" does not seem to go far enough. While the 
bare consideration of more cases can alter the influence certain features have 
on our intuitions, it may leave in place influences that would be rejected as 
distortionary by more careful reflection on the nature of the factors themselves. 
For instance, features like someone's race or sex can influence our judgments 
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even when we explicitly reject the idea that they should do so (Greenwald and 
Banaji 1995). While those of us who explicitly reject racism and sexism may 
try to purge our intuitions of this influence, there are actually two features of 
this practice which are at odds with the methodological stance of radical anti-
theory. First, we do so in the service of our general ethical views, such as the 
principle that race and sex are utterly devoid of non-instrumental ethical rele-
vance. Second, in determining how to revise our corrupted intuitions, we often 
compare our intuitions about some cases with our intuitions about others (cf. 
Schumacher 1996; "now imagine she's white"). More importantly, the method 
of more cases does not by itself enable someone to reason her way to seeing 
these factors as illicit prejudices if she uncritically accepts them as relevant, 
even if she would reject their relevance if she thought more carefully about 
what they are. 
For instance, the ethical intuitions of an unabashedly racist slaveholder about 
such questions as when it is permissible to force someone into slavery might be 
systematically sensitive to race per se. If this were pointed out to him, he might 
initially boast that this was the result of his superior moral discernment, which 
is evidently more refined and sensitive than that of crude abolitionists, whose 
ability to perceive the moral relevance of race must have been dulled. But his 
response could be quite different if it were pointed out to him that all race per 
se really amounts to is the presence of superficial phenotypic traits like skin 
color and hair texture as a result of one's area of ancestry. This would probably 
put him on the defensive, making him fumble for the standard theoretical 
rationalizations of the time such as slaves' having lesser intellectual abilities, 
which would make him vulnerable to Thomas Jefferson's (1809) observation 
that "whatever be their degree of fintellectual] talent it is no measure of their 
rights. Because Sir Isaac Newton was superior to others in understanding, he 
was not therefore lord of the person or property of others." 
Upon finding it directly implausible that race per se - when it is distinguished 
and clarified - has non-instrumental ethical relevance, our slaveholder could 
revise his views and see his racist case-intuitions as problematic. Exposing 
one's views about the ethical relevance of factors to such direct questions about 
whether they really should matter in the ways one implicitly or initially takes 
them to matter seems clearly to be an important method of exposing one's 
views to critical scrutiny. Views that result from eliminating the influences 
of factors which - upon better appreciating what they are - seem indefensible 
are surely more critically informed than views that uncritically endorse our 
case-intuitions without asking whether the factors that influence them should 
matter. 
This form of critical scrutiny clearly goes beyond the method of more cases. 
Moreover, the methodological stance of radical anti-theory appears to rule out 
such criticism of one's views about the relevance of factors and one's systematic 
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sensitivities to them. The radical anti-theorist seems committed to the view 
that the directly plausible idea that skin color and area of ancestry lack non-
instrumental ethical relevance is precisely the sort of ethical generalization 
that cannot be had. 
The extent to which a radical anti-theory cannot allow direct questions 
about whether factors should matter in the ways they matter to our case-intu-
itions may, however, depend upon exactly how radical the anti-theory is. The 
most radical anti-theory might hold that we must simply perceive the final 
ethical status of particular acts, and that we cannot criticize these perceptions 
in terms of any theoretical views about why the act should have this status. 
Dancy, however, seems to reject this, and to hold instead that we can rely 
upon our direct views about the exact ethical relevance a factor should have 
in a given case. So Dancy would seem to allow us to criticize our views by 
asking whether, once we appreciate what some factor really is, it should have 
the relevance in a given case that we initially took it to have. For instance, our 
slaveholder might initially intuit that it was perfectly permissible for some par-
ticular individual - say Kunta Kinte - to be enslaved. We might confront the 
slaveholder with the directly plausible thoughts that the great harm this did 
to Kunta Kinte and the violations of his autonomy it involved were powerful 
reasons against it, which could not be justified by the minor gains it conferred 
on those benefitting from the slave trade. If the slaveholder objected that the 
relevance of the harm and autonomy violation are disabled by Kunta Kinte's 
race, we could point out that race is nothing more than superficial phenotype 
resulting from area of ancestry, and it seems directly implausible that this 
should matter in itself. 
In this way, I believe that Dancy's anti-theory can allow us to criticize our intu-
itions about the ethical status of particular acts by determining whether propo-
sitions about the ethical relevance of certain factors are defensible. Engaging in 
such criticism would be a significant advance over the sadly common practice, 
in both everyday life and philosophy, of uncritically accepting certain intui-
tions about the final ethical status of acts in particular cases, with little if any 
thought as to whether the factors present in those cases can, once clarified and 
understood, plausibly support that status. There are, however, two shortcom-
ings of this restriction of thoughts about the ethical relevance of factors to 
particular cases. The first is that the most apparently defensible propositions 
about the ethical relevance of factors have a generality that extends beyond a 
particular case. Thus the propositions that: 
(Gl) skin color and area of ancestry per se are ethically irrelevant, and 
(G2) all else held equal, the fact that an act would harm someone is a moral 
reason against it 
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are more directly plausible than the propositions that: 
(Pl) Kunta Kinte's skin color and area of ancestry do not disable the fact that 
slavery will harm him from disfavoring enslaving him, and 
(PZ) all else held equal, the fact that slavery will harm Kunta Kinte disfavors 
enslaving him. 
(Pl) and (PZ) are surely plausible, but there seems to be nothing special about 
Kunta Kinte's case that deprives his skin color and area of ancestry of non-in-
strumental relevance or makes the harmfulness of enslaving him a reason not 
to enslave him. Consequently, the truths of (Pl) and (PZ) are most plausibly 
seen as grounded in the more general truths of (Gl) and (GZ). Moreover, (PZ) 
might not initially seem so plausible or defensible to someone who, like the 
slaveholder, is not very sympathetic to Kunta Kinte. The force of (PZ) might 
be apparent to such an individual only by considering {GZ) and deriving {PZ) 
from it.3 Coming to appreciate the force of (PZ) in this way seems clearly to be 
a way of coming to more critically informed beliefs as a result of exposing one's 
views to scrutiny. 
A second and related problem is that it might seem directly plausible that a 
factor has a certain ethical relevance in a case, and the factor might come to 
be seen as irrelevant on reflection only when a more general proposition about 
its relevance is considered. Perhaps the least controversial examples of this are 
when the factor seems to have a certain kind of relevance primarily because it 
occurs together (and may be conflated) with another factor of more obvious 
irrelevance. For instance, I mentioned above the rationalization of slavery in 
terms of the allegedly lesser intellectual abilities of slaves. This was an empirical 
falsehood, but there surely were some slaves who happened to be born with 
mild to moderate intellectual disabilities and consequently had the intel-
lectual abilities that slaveholders thought were typical of all slaves.4 Suppose 
that Mildred was one such mildly intellectually disabled slave, who had been 
kidnapped from her homeland and purchased by our slaveholder, and that he 
routinely beats her severely for trivial reasons. Now our slaveholder might find 
it highly plausible that it is permissible for him to beat Mildred because "she's 
just a dumb slave" - that is, he might find it highly plausible that 
(P3) Mildred's lesser intellectual ability per se weakens the strength with 
which the fact that beating her causes her pain disfavors beating her. 
But if our slaveholder reflected, he might recognize that - when distinguished 
from such things as influencing how much pain an act causes someone - intel-
lectual ability per se seems quite irrelevant to the strength of our reasons not to 
cause someone pain. That is, he might find it highly implausible that: 
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(G3) Someone's intellectual ability per se affects the strength of our reasons 
not to cause her pain. 
The implausibility of this idea might be illustrated, a la Jefferson, by the 
plausible idea that 
(P4) The lesser intellectual ability of the slaveholder's own daughter per sewould 
not weaken the strength with which the fact that Isaac Newton's beating her 
would cause her pain counts against Isaac Newton's beating her.5 
Appreciating the implausibility of (G3) - once its content is carefully clarified 
and illustrated by (P4) - could cause our slaveholder to revise his views about 
the plausibility of (P3). This would seem to be a clear instance of coming to have 
a more critically informed set of ethical beliefs as a result of having reflected 
more fully upon whether the factors to which they attribute ethical relevance 
really should have such relevance. But if Dancy's anti-theoretical stance were 
correct, then our slaveholder's revising (P3) in light of the general implausibility 
of (G3) and its illustration (P4) would be terrible reasoning. For according to 
Dancy, (G3) can be dismissed as false simply because it is general, making its 
implausibility irrelevant to whether there is anything wrong with (P3).6 
I believe, however, that Dancy offers no good reasons for denying in this way 
the evident legitimacy of critically scrutinizing our beliefs about the relevance 
of factors in particular cases by reference to the plausibility and implausibility 
of thoughts about the general kinds of differences they should make. Dancy 
(2004, 2013) argues in favor of the particularist view that basic ethical facts 
cannot be derived from a set of exceptionless propositions about what factors 
favor and oppose acts without reference to context. But ethicists very often 
consider general principles about the relevance of factors that are implicitly 
and even explicitly understood to be ceteris paribus or all else held equal. As 
Little (2001) and Lance and Little (2006) argue, the idea that we should be able 
to support our claims about the ethical relevance of factors by reference to 
such ceteris paribus principles is perfectly compatible with Dancy's arguments 
in favor of particularism. 
Dancy's rejection of this method of criticism would, moreover, allow us to 
shelter our prejudicial views about the relevance of certain factors from critical 
scrutiny by conflating them with other factors that, on reflection, seem 
clearly irrelevant. The only difference to which our slaveholder might be able 
to point between his beating Mildred and Newton's kidnapping and beating 
his daughter might be Mildred's race. However, while our slaveholder pre-re-
flectively thought race highly ethically relevant, he might now admit, upon 
realizing that race amounts to no more than things like skin color and area 
of ancestry, that race is devoid of non-instrumental relevance. Yet race may 
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still have a powerful influence on his intuitions and incautious judgments of 
plausibility - just as it does on ours. Consequently, the slaveholder may find 
both (P3) and (P4) plausible due largely to Mildred's race - as well, perhaps, as 
other irrelevant factors irrelevant like bias towards his own daughter. 
This might be sufficient to convince the slaveholder that either (P3) or (P4) 
is mistaken. But it might not be - he might insist that, although there is a 
danger of racism and personal bias, he is quite confident that it is his accurate 
ethical insight which tells him that Mildred's intellectual abilities justify him 
in beating Mildred, but his daughter's abilities would not justify Newton in 
beating his daughter. Moreover, even if the slaveholder agreed that there was a 
problem with his accepting both (P3) and (P4), how should he determine which 
to reject? Is he being insensitive to Mildred or biased in favor of his daughter? 
Critical reflection seems quite clearly to supply the answer by reference to the 
direct implausibility of (G3) once its content is carefully clarified and distin-
guished from such thoughts as that to the effect that intellectual ability can 
influence the pain caused by certain acts. Since someone's intellectual ability 
per se seems in the abstract to be irrelevant to the case against causing her pain, 
it is the slaveholder's judgment that Mildred's intellectual abilities justify his 
doing so that need to give. 
3 The insufficiency of appeals to "practical wisdom" 
As I mentioned above, radical anti-theorists tend to suggest that, in place 
of thoughts about which principles would be plausible or defensible, we 
should seek to revise and go beyond our initial case-intuitions by gaining 
or deferring to individuals who have more of a certain kind of experience or 
ability. Dancy's fruitful - but as I have argued insufficient - suggestion that 
the relevant experience is that of considering many similar cases is not the 
only proposal. Most others can be understood as variants of the idea that the 
kind of experiences and abilities we should seek to gain and defer to are those 
that constitute phronesis or "practical wisdom." Some anti-theorists suggest 
that the wisdom-making experiences are certain forms of engagement with 
the arts, or other ways of vividly imagining features of potential ethical sig-
nificance (Diamond 1991). Others suggest that it is the possession of a set of 
character traits described by thick concepts like COURAGE, HONESTY, and JUSTICE 
(Hursthouse 1996). 
These do, at least often, seem intended as methodological proposals about 
how to resolve our basic ethical uncertainties and disagreements in the uncon-
strained context of normative and practical ethical inquiry. But very often they 
are proposals about very different issues, such as: how ordinary people in fact 
make ethical judgments, how ethically ideal people would make ethical judg-
ments, how we should respond to situations in the heat of the moment, what 
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will most effectively convince people of ethical conclusions the truth of which 
we have already established or simply stipulated, and under what conditions 
we should credit people with knowledge of these truths.7 It is crucial to dis-
tinguish these questions from that of the appropriate methodology for nor-
mative and practical ethics. For instance, perhaps "the morally perfect person" 
would effortlessly intuit the basic ethical status of each act without any need 
for thoughts about generalities - or indeed any other kind of basic ethical 
reasoning. That's ducky for the morally perfect person, but for those of us who 
are trying earnestly to determine the ethical facts of the matter regarding sub-
stantive issues about which we are uncertain or in disagreement, it is extremely 
unhelpful. It would be supreme intellectual arrogance to presume without 
argument that we are the morally perfect person whose intuitions are infal-
lible, or the party whose views are in agreement with this omniscient ethical 
intuiter. 
The main problem with these wisdom-based suggestions as methods of scru-
tinizing and going beyond our initial case-intuitions is that which specific expe-
riences and character traits are wisdom-making is typically just as uncertain 
and controversial as the first-order uncertainties and disagreements that they 
are invoked to help resolve. An abolitionist would no doubt think that we can 
gain wisdom about the ethics of slavery by reading such literature as Uncle 
Tom's Cabin, and attending vividly to the harms and unfreedoms inflicted 
upon the slaves. She would dismiss the Anti-Tom literature as crude propa-
ganda, and suggest that focusing on such things as the greater life expectancy 
of slaves (if this were true) and their phenotypic and cultural differences from 
whites was distortionary. On the other hand a racist proponent of slavery would 
no doubt think the opposite - that we can gain wisdom about the ethics of 
slavery by reading the Anti-Tom literature, and attending vividly to the greater 
life expectancy of slaves and their phenotypic and cultural differences from 
whites. He would dismiss Uncle Tom's Cabin as crude propaganda, and suggest 
that focusing on such things as the harms and unfreedoms inflicted on slaves 
was distortionary. One who was undecided might try reading and focusing 
on both sets of books and considerations, but would no doubt come to view 
as more distortionary whichever influences did not accord with her eventual 
conclusions. 
This is not to say that experiencing the arts and more vividly attending 
to certain considerations is useless from the point of view of ethical inquiry. 
Crucial examples and ideas may be suggested to us by the arts, and we may not 
fully appreciate what a factor amounts to until we attend to it more vividly. 
But whether our ethical judgments about those examples, ideas, and factors 
can ultimately withstand critical scrutiny is not something that can be settled 
simply by experiencing the arts and vividly attending to the factors. The arts 
furnish important raw materials for ethical arguments, but they are no substitute 
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for ethical arguments. Vivid attention in the service of understanding what a 
factor amounts to is an important part of ethical argument, but it cannot on 
its own secure the defensibility of our ideas about the importance of that factor 
in relation to all other factors.8 
Similar remarks go for the method of trying to improve our judgments by 
developing or deferring to the character traits described by thick concepts. 
Simply in virtue of her initial judgments about slavery, an abolitionist will 
think that the maximally just individual or maximally virtuous phronemos 
will be someone who condemns slavery. On the other hand a defender of 
slavery - like Aristotle himself - will, simply in virtue of his initial views about 
slavery, think that the maximally just person or phronemos will not condemn 
slavery. 
I should emphasize that this does not have to be a problem for virtue ethics 
conceived as the normative ethical doctrine that what is ethically virtuous 
explains what it is ethically right to do (Hursthouse 1996). A proponent of 
virtue ethics so conceived is completely free to develop her view of what spe-
cific character traits are morally virtuous by whatever methods of ethical 
reasoning she finds appropriate. I am arguing, in effect, that in order for her 
account of the virtues to withstand sufficient critical scrutiny, she will need 
defensible (ceteris paribus) principles about what descriptive features of char-
acter traits make them virtuous. I see no reason why a virtue ethicist cannot 
try to articulate such principles - even if many people attracted to virtue ethics 
happen to be radical anti-theorists who are content to rely uncritically on their 
own intuitions about virtue and dismiss contrary views without argument as 
evident products of the "wrong" moral education. 
4 The insufficiency of unaided debunking explanations 
There is one final method of critically evaluating our intuitions - which might 
not seem to involve ethical principles - that has received a great deal of recent 
attention. This is to examine the etiology of our intuitions to see whether 
it might render them suspect. Some authors, like Singer (2005), suggest that 
such "debunking explanations" render all case-intuitions suspect and in need 
of vindication by defensible principles. But others have suggested that these 
debunking explanations might be applied more selectively, allowing us to 
screen out some case-intuitions while continuing to rely upon others in a more 
or less foundational way in our ethical reasoning (Huemer 2008, Sandburg 
and Juth 2011, Liao et al. 2012, McMahan 2013). In this section I consider an 
extreme form of the second proposal that might be utilized by a radical anti-
theorist. This is the idea that we can use selective debunking explanations to 
critically scrutinize and go beyond our initial case-intuitions without having to 
see whether they can be justified by defensible ethical principles. 
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Various of our case-intuitions have been empirically shown to be sensitive to 
the following kinds of influences. 
Framing and Ordering Effects. How a situation is described or the order in 
which features are considered can influence our intuitions. For instance, 
1\rersky and Kahneman (1981) found that a hypothetical policy which resulted 
in 200 out of 600 individuals living was more likely to be chosen if its outcome 
was described as "200 people being saved" than if it was described as "400 
people dying." Similarly, Liao et al. (2012) found that subjects' intuitions about 
whether it is permissible to divert a trolley from killing five individuals to 
killing one whose being lethally struck is needed to save the five (known as 
the "loop variant") are sensitive to which similar cases they considered before 
making the judgment. 
Emotional Influences. Our intuitions can be influenced by our emotions. 
For instance, Schnall et al. (2008) showed that subjects are more likely to 
make harsher moral judgments about others' conduct if they are exposed to 
disgusting stimuli such as bad smells and dirty desks. 
Social Influences. Ow intuitions are sensitive in non-rational ways to the judg-
ments of those around us. Subjects' intuitions have been shown to shift rather 
automatically to conform to those of their social groups, interaction partners, 
and intimates (Newcomb et al. 1965, Chen et al. 1996, Davis and Rusbult 2001). 
Haidt (2001) argues that this shapes many of our ethical intuitions, and Kuhse 
and Singer (1985) suggest that the historical influence of Christianity has come 
by this mechanism to shape contemporary western views about the impermis-
sibility of infanticide. 
Another point that is often made is that our intuitions are the result of proc-
esses of natural selection that shaped our psychology (Singer 2005, Huemer 
2008, Lazari-Radek and Singer 2012). It is, however, not obvious why this 
feature of the etiology of our intuitions should be a reason to place less con-
fidence in them without constituting an equally strong reason to place less 
confidence in all of our ethical cognitions, no matter how general or critically 
informed. For all of our ethical judgments result from our psychological proc-
esses, which have been shaped by evolution. 
What Singer and Lazari-Radek essentially seem to suggest is that if we can 
show that some particular ethical judgment was biologically adaptive (i.e. such 
to increase the representation of the genes of its holder in future populations), 
then it is suspect, but that if it is simply a spandrel (i.e. a result of evolution that 
did not contribute to its holders' genetic representation), then its evolutionary 
history casts no doubt upon its truth. But why should spandrels be in better 
order than adaptations? As Mason (2011) observes, Singer and Lazari-Radek 
seem to misunderstand the logic of evolutionary debunking arguments. The 
fact that our visual systems were adaptive is not a reason to doubt them because 
the explanation of why they were adaptive involves their being reliable trackers 
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of the facts they represent. On the other hand, if the mere fact that some ethical 
intuition was adaptive is a reason to doubt it, this is because the adaptive story 
does not make reference to its truth - and as Street (2006) argues, the simplest 
adaptive stories do not seem to make reference to intuitions' tracking mind-in-
dependent truths. But here is the problem for Singer and Lazari-Radek: even if 
some ethical judgments are spandrels, the simplest accounts of how they arose 
still do not seem to make reference to their tracking a mind-independent order 
of ethical truths - these accounts simply make reference to how our evolved 
psychologies interacted with our environments to produce the relevant judg-
ments (Harman 1977). So if evolution debunks adaptive intuitions, evolution 
and social history debunk all ethical cognitions. 
The apparent explanatory impotence of mind-independent ethical facts 
does not seem, however, to debunk all ethical cognitions. Our not seeming to 
need a particular kind of mind-independent fact to account for our judgments 
looks quite irrelevant to the reasonableness of trying to resolve our basic ethical 
uncertainties and disagreements by determining what ethical views can best 
withstand critical scrutiny. Each metaethical theory will have its own explan-
ation of why this is the case, but almost all would agree that it operates as a con-
straint on metaethical theorizing.9 Perhaps it is because ethical facts are simply 
facts about our own mental structures - not those embodied in our current 
attitudes, but those that would be manifest in our attitudes after exposing them 
to maximal critical scrutiny (Brandt 1959, Street 2008). Alternatively, all nor-
mative judgments - including both ethical judgments and judgments about 
their epistemic status - may express non-cognitive attitudes, like our accept-
ance of certain principles for what to believe, feel, and do (Gibbard 1990, 2003). 
If this is right, then our claim that ethical views formed by critical scrutiny are 
more likely to be correct simply expresses our basic commitment to putting 
more stock in such views, rather than, like Hermann Goring, having a megalo-
maniacal faith in our own uncritical reactions. Or perhaps there is some other 
way in which there can be a mind-independent order of ethical truths that, in 
virtue of their very different nature from scientific truths, need not play any 
similar role in explaining our ethical judgments (Parfit 2011). 
So, whatever the explanation as to why, it seems that we should not treat the 
mere fact that an intuition has an adaptive evolutionary history that does not 
make reference to mind-independent ethical facts as a reason to doubt it. This 
seems clearly to be appropriate in the case of intuitions that can be justified by 
directly plausible principles. For instance, we intuit that we have most practical 
reason not to do things like hit ourselves with hammers when this would serve 
no further purpose.10 Part of the explanation of why we have these intuitions 
may well be that such judgments were evolutionary adaptations. But it seems 
that we should not care, because these intuitions can be justified by defensible 
ethical principles, such as: 
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(G4) The fact that an act will cause one pain is (at least ceteris paribus) a prac-
tical reason for one not to perform it. 
(G4) seems to have an overwhelming degree of direct plausibility, which seems 
extremely unlikely to be overturned by further scrutiny of the concepts it 
involves. This might well be in part because accepting (G4) was adaptive, but 
this seems irrelevant. 
All of this having been said, when we are not sure whether an intuition can be 
justified by defensible principles, it does seem that an explanation of its origin 
as an adaptation should make us worry. Such worries appear justified, because 
the adaptive explanation of the intuition decreases the probability that it will 
be justifiable by defensible principles. The reason for this is that it increases the 
probability that the intuition has been generated by forces other than a tacit 
grasp on defensible principles that we cannot yet articulate. This is of course 
consistent with the possibility that the intuition will prove justifiable by some 
other defensible principle. But it seems less likely that an intuition should by 
luck turn out to be justifiable by principles, our grasp on which played no role 
in its origin, than by principles that played some role in its genesis. 
But if this is correct, the selective application of evolutionary debunking 
arguments actually presupposes the view that we should not accept an intuition 
unless it can be subsumed under defensible ethical principles. This is sufficient 
to render such selective evolutionary debunking arguments useless to radical 
anti-theorists who might wish to use them to scrutinize our intuitions in the 
place of attempts to see whether these intuitions can be justified by defensible 
principles. 
l believe that useful criticisms of intuitions in terms of their resulting 
from framing and ordering effects and social and emotional influences also 
presuppose that, in order to be defensible, intuitions must be justified by 
defensible principles. It might seem that, because intuitions about cases that 
stem from framing and ordering effects are affected by features like salience to 
the intuiter, which are not genuine features of the cases, we need presuppose 
no substantive ethical principles in criticizing them on this basis. There might, 
however, be a coherent view according to which the actual ethical status of 
each act is relative to the judge and dependent upon the salience of various 
features to her. If so, then because such a view would sanction intuitions that 
result from framing effects, our rejection of these intuitions as problematic 
presupposes the falsity of this view. But how would we know that the view is 
false? Surely it would be due to the overwhelming direct implausibility of its 
principle: 
(G6) How salient a feature is to a judge influences the genuine ethical status 
of acts relative to that judge. 
I 9781137344540_26_c24jndd 624 2/6/2015 9:13:13 PM I 
PROOF 
Directly Plausible Principles 625 
Perhaps more importantly, the sensitivity of intuitions to framing and ordering 
effects tells us that we are making a mistake, but it does not by itself tell us 
which mistake. We know, for instance, that we should not both accept and 
reject the policy that results in 200 out of 600 individuals living, but learning 
about the sensitivity of our intuitions to framing effects does not by itself tell 
us whether we should accept or reject it. Similarly, we know that it is not both 
permissible and impermissible to divert t he trolley in the "loop variant," but 
learning about the sensitivity of our intuitions to ordering effects does not by 
itself tell us whether it is permissible. Nor can our intuitions about other cases 
that are uncorrupted by framing and ordering effects help tell us determine 
which intuition about these cases is mistaken unless there are defensible prin-
ciples that can connect our thinking about these cases to our thinking about 
others. Consequently, criticizing some intuitions as corrupted by framing 
and ordering effects will be of little if any use to the radical anti-theorist who 
wishes to revise and go beyond our initial intuitions without having to rely 
upon defensible ethical principles. 
Similarly, the fact that an intuition is a result of social or emotional mecha-
nisms can be a reason to suspect that it might be mistaken, but it cannot be a 
very conclusive reason to think that it is in the absence of considerations about 
whether it can be supported by defensible ethical principles. For instance, 
views about the impermissibility of infanticide are not the only distinctive 
legacy that Christianity left to western society. Christian ideas about human 
equality have with equal likelihood inspired our "deviant" views about the 
wrongness of slavery and obligations to the poor, unfortunate, and oppressed. 
While Nietzsche seemed to think that this is a good reason to throw these 
beliefs over too, the genetic fallacy is so called for good reasons. As Levi (1980, 
1) observes, beliefs that turn out to be perfectly defensible are very often "born 
on the wrong side of the blanket." 
Or consider the intuition that, if you saw a child drowning in front of you, 
and saving her would cost you nothing but the ruin of your $200 shoes ('Pond 
case'; Singer 1972), it would be morally wrong not to save her. This intuition has 
very likely been influenced by emotional mechanisms, which may play a role in 
explaining why we do not similarly intuit that it would be wrong not to give an 
alliance of aid organizations $200 which could be expected to do even more life-
saving good ('Envelope case'; Unger 1996). Ifwe are to criticize our intuitions by 
simply purging those that have been influenced by emotional mechanisms, we 
should presumably retain our intuition that it is permissible to give nothing in 
the Envelope case but eliminate our intuition that it would be wrong not to save 
the child in the Pond case. This might make certain extreme libertarians happy, 
but such purging of cognitions simply because of their emotional origin would, 
as Mason (2011) observes, be a commission of what Antonio Damasio (1994) 
calls "Descartes' error." As Damasio argues, our emotions very often help us in 
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our practical reasoning by drawing our attention to features which would not in 
their absence receive sufficient attention - like the fact that children really will 
die if we do not sacrifice our mere luxuries. 
Of course, one must somehow determine which socially influenced beliefs 
are perfectly defensible and which features highlighted by emotion really do 
deserve the highlighting. The answer as to how we must do this is as obvious 
as it is unavailable to radical anti-theorists: we must determine which beliefs 
and intuitions can be justified by defensible ethical principles. 
5 The supremacy of ethical principles 
I have thus argued that, in order to expose our initial case-intuitions to 
maximal critical scrutiny, we must determine whether they can be justified 
by defensible ethical principles. As my discussion has suggested, a natural and 
potentially powerful way to determine whether a principle is defensible is to 
determine whether it either follows from or is itself among those principles 
that are most directly plausible once we have fully understood their content. In 
this section I argue in favor of this criterion of defensibility by contending that 
appearances of direct plausibility are more foundational than case-intuitions. 
While we can use case-intuitions to suggest principles and help us understand 
what principles are really saying, maximally critical methods will not allow us 
to abandon a principle simply because it conflicts with our case-intuitions. 
As I noted above, most normative and practical ethicists are not radical anti-
theorists; they agree that there is some important role for principles in our 
ethical reasoning. But in practice many come close to giving case-intuitions a 
methodological role that is nearly as central as that given to them by radical 
anti-theorists, namely that of rock-solid data that our ethical principles must 
fit. Of course, if we were to literally fit our principles to our case-intuitions 
whatever these case-intuitions happened to be, the principles could play abso-
lutely no role in critically scrutinizing or justifying our intuitions. For any 
pattern of intuitions whatever, we could find some gerrymandered set of 
general propositions about the ethical relevance of factors to fit them. 
Perhaps the most intuition-centric criterion for when a principle is defensible 
that retains some critical force is that a principle is defensible if it is part of or 
derivable from a best systemization of our case-intuitions - viz. a set of principles 
that gives us the best trade-off between simplicity and fit with our case-intui-
tions (cf. Rawls 1951, 184-6; 1971, 46-8; Kagan 1989, 11; Unger 1996, 94). One 
problem with this best systemization approach is that how simple our ethical 
principles should be seems to be something that cannot be dictated at the 
outset of ethical inquiry, but should be determined instead by a more direct 
examination of which proposals regarding the fundamental ethical relevance 
of factors will bear scrutiny. 
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More importantly, the best systemization approach seems clearly to give us 
insufficient critical purchase on the intuitions being systemized. Such system-
ization will primarily remove outlying intuitions that are at variance with the 
general pattern of the bulk of our judgments. But it will leave in place the 
more pervasive influences of certain factors that we would reject as irrelevant 
upon a more careful examination of what they amount to. For instance, the 
best systemization of the intuitions of someone who is deeply racist, sexist, or 
elitist might leave in place the influences of race, sex, and social status. But, as 
we have seen, clarification of what these factors really amount to might make 
them seem directly implausible. 
It is difficult to see how a principle could be defensible unless it either follows 
from or is itself a principle which is to some extent directly plausible (at least 
once it is clarified and fully understood). Most ethicists seem to accept that 
a fundamental principle's having some degree of such direct plausibility is a 
necessary condition for it to be defensible (Rawls 1951, 188-9; 1971, 48; Kamm 
1993, 6-7; 2007, 5; McMahan 2013, 112). But there are significant differences 
among ethicists in how seriously they take this necessary condition, and the 
role that they allow intuitions to play in selecting among rival candidate prin-
ciples, each of which have some initial degree of direct plausibility. 
Some ethicists seem to pay only lip service to the requirement that principles 
must be directly plausible, and in practice simply fit their principles to their 
case-intuitions with very token regard for the direct plausibility of the results. 
For instance, after acknowledging the requirement of direct plausibility in the 
introductions to her books, Kamm (1993, 2007) proceeds to spend almost their 
entirety determining - in an admirably rigorous and systematic way - what 
principles would fit her intuitions about a great many cases. But the resulting 
principles are manifestly implausible, attributing complicated kinds of non-
instrumental ethical significance to such factors as bare physical distance and 
the relative directness with which events cause benefits and harms. Although 
these seem as directly implausible as principles that attribute non-instrumental 
relevance to skin color, Kamm spends only a few sentences saying extremely 
hazy things in half-hearted attempts to make them seem plausible (2007, 164- 7, 
386- 7). In some places, she openly admits that she cannot see how even these 
obscure remarks fit the content of her principles (2007, 166-7). 
Along these lines, in order to fit her intuitions about variants of the Pond 
and Envelope cases, Kamm proposes a principle according to which someone's 
physical proximity per se affects our duties to aid her. In defense of this she 
suggests that if we think that there are special moral permissions to give our 
own interests more weight than they have from an impartial perspective, we 
might as well take physical distance to make a non-instrumental moral dif-
ference because "After all, we are locatable beings, positioned at the center of 
our world in virtue of taking an agent-centered perspective. We also identify 
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with our means that are locatable" (2007, 387). These remarks shield Kamm's 
intuitions behind an obscure haze of words rather than successfully show 
them to withstand critical scrutiny. For almost any pattern of intuitions, we 
could probably mutter some similarly pseudo-relevant-sounding muddle over 
them. For instance, if our slaveholder were desperately trying to defend the 
non-instrumental relevance of skin color to the permissibility of kidnapping 
someone, he might say, "rights not to be kidnapped are located in the person. 
But after all, persons are colored beings, colored by and coloring the rights they 
have. We also identify with those of our color." 
I believe that some of the considerations that motivate Kamm's method are 
laudable, and that she seems easy to criticize only because she pursues this 
method more rigorously and successfully than others who are in effect pur-
suing it. Kamm is rightly motivated by the excellent point that we may not 
have a very good idea what the most defensible principles might be until we 
examine those suggested by our intuitions in a great variety of cases. Where 
Kamm seems to go wrong is in her confidence in the final victory of her case-
intuitions, no matter how badly her principles seem to be losing their battles 
for direct plausibility. Just as we have no reason to think that initial appear-
ances of the plausibility of principles will always withstand careful scrutiny of 
their contents, we have no reason to expect that our case-intuitions will always 
be justifiable by principles the plausibility of which withstands such scrutiny. 
Probably most normative and practical ethicists take the requirement that 
prin ciples be directly plausible somewhat more seriously than Kamm, and 
would describe themselves as following the method Rawls (1971, 19-21, 48-52) 
called that of seeking a 'reflective equilibrium' between our case-intuitions 
and those principles that seem to us directly plausible. This method holds that 
(i) to be defensible fundamental principles must have some degree of direct 
plausibility, (ii) we should often revise our case-intuitions to fit such principles, 
but also (iii) in choosing among such principles we may sometimes look to our 
case-intuitions. There are, however, two very different ways in which we can 
use case-intuitions to influence our choice among principles that seem ini-
tially plausible, which tend not to be clearly distinguished. 
The first method is to treat the fact that a principle fits more case-intuitions 
as a reason in itself to accept the principle. This can result in our accepting prin-
ciples that are less directly plausible but better aligned with our case-intuitions 
over principles that are more directly plausible but more at odds with them.11 
The problem with this, however, is that such sacrifices of principles that seem 
more directly plausible after careful clarification to mere case-intuitions seems 
to allow our less critically informed, systematic biases to overwhelm what 
critical scrutiny has revealed to be more defensible. For instance, consider our 
slaveholder's great-grandfather, who was an English aristocrat. This aristocrat 
often beat the peasants who lived on his large rural estate for trivial reasons, 
I 9781137344540_26_c24.indd 628 2/6!2015 9:13:13 PM I 
PROOF 
Directly Plausible Principles 629 
but was extremely punctilious in his treatment of other aristocrats. He found 
direct plausibility in the following principle: 
(G7) The fact that someone is not a gentleman (or lady) per se weakens one's 
moral reasons against beating him. 
We might ask our aristocrat to think more carefully about what this is really 
saying - that to be a gentleman is simply something like to have been born to 
certain parents, had a certain education, and have certain speech patterns and 
other mannerisms. Why should who someone's parents were, how educated 
he is, and the aesthetic qualities of his mannerisms have any bearing in them-
selves on our moral reasons not to cause him pain? Our aristocrat might see the 
force of this, finding the following more directly plausible: 
(G8) All else held equal, the strength of our non-instrumental moral reasons 
not to harm someone depend on the degree of harm. Who his parents were, 
how educated he is, and his aesthetic qualities per se are irrelevant to our 
moral reasons not to harm him. 
Our aristocrat might, however, still find some degree of plausibility in (G7), even 
after it has been clarified to him what being a gentleman amounts to. Moreover, 
(G7) - perhaps together with some modification of (G8) that accommodates it -
would surely fit many of his intuitions much better than (G8) in its unmodified 
form. If the aristocrat were to follow the practice of rejecting principles simply 
to fit case-intuitions, his reasoning might look like the following: 
Ifwe had special obligations to someone's parents, and they had special obli-
gations to him, perhaps they transfer by a kind of transitivity. Also someone's 
greater education and more refined aesthetic properties make him cooler 
and thus in some sense "better" - and we may owe more to those who are 
better. I grant that it's hard to see why we would have special obligations to 
every gent leman's ancestors, and the transference idea looks a little hokey. 
I also grant that the kind of "betterness" here seems pretty orthogonal to 
our reasons not to harm someone. So I grant that (G8) seems much more 
luminously self-evident than (G7). But many of my strongest case-intuitions 
suggest that it matters morally whether someone is a gentleman, and Rawls 
said that I could work from both ends. 
If we could be just a little less smug, I think that we could see that our favoring 
less directly plausible principles simply because they fit our case-intuitions is 
equally an instance of our letting our less critically informed prejudices get the 
better of us. 
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There is, however, a second way of using case-intuitions to help select princi-
ples that seem initially to be directly plausible. This is to use the cases to help 
us understand what the principles are really saying, and to illustrate the genu-
inely direct plausibility or implausibility of the principles. For instance, when 
Singer (1972, 231) first introduced the Pond case, he did so only to illustrate 
the direct plausibility of the following principle regarding the obliging force of 
reasons of beneficence: 
(G9) All else held equal, if you can prevent someone from suffering a serious 
harm at relatively trivial cost to yourself, it is morally wrong not to do so.12 
The point of the Pond case was not to show that (G9) fits our case-intuitions, 
but rather to give us a more concrete understanding of how plausible the idea 
contained in (G9) really is - in itself and independent of what else it supports 
or entails. In considering the Pond case, we can see how the fact that we would 
lose $200 looks like a terrible justification for not saving the drowning child -
precisely because the harm to the child is so great and the cost to us is so trivial. 
By giving a concrete illustration of what relatively trivial costs really look like 
in relation to serious harms when we pay sufficient attention to them, the Pond 
case helps us better appreciate what (G9) is really saying, in a way that amplifies 
its direct plausibility. After we have clarified (G9) and its plausibility in this way, 
its conflicts with other intuitions, like that to the effect that it is pe.rmissible to 
spend money on luxuries rather than donate them to aid organizations, seem to 
count much more obviously against the intuitions than against the principle. 
The contrast between using cases as data that principles should fit and using 
cases to illustrate and clarify principles may be even clearer when it comes to the 
criticism of initially plausible principles. For instance, in thinking about whether 
there is a morally relevant difference between Pond and Envelope, an initially 
plausible difference seems to be that in Envelope there are many other individ-
uals who could help, and if everyone helped the serious harm could be prevented 
at much less cost to us (Singer 1972, 233; Unger 1996, 39; Murphy 2000). Along 
these lines, something like the following principle might seem plausible: 
(GlO) You cannot be morally required to do more at greater cost to yourself 
just because others are not doing their fair share - even if the additional cost 
would be trivial in comparison to the significant harm you would prevent. 
Singer and Unger, however, consider a case like the following: 
Multiple Children. One child is drowning near you and another is drowning 
across the stream near someone else. If you were both to wade in and save 
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the child near you, you would each ruin only your $200 shoes. But the other 
person walks away. Now, if you save the child across the stream after saving 
the child near you, you will ruin your $200 designer jacket in addition to 
your $200 shoes. 
(GlO) implies that it would be permissible to save only the child near you and 
then walk away, allowing the second child to drown. But this seems worse 
than counterintuitive. I do not believe that Singer and Unger are suggesting 
that we should reject (GlO) simply because it conflicts with our case-intuition 
about Multiple Children. They are instead using the case to help illustrate more 
clearly what it really means to think that the unfairness of slightly greater 
trivial costs to morally conscientious helpers is a more important consider-
ation than the fact that someone will die if these trivial costs are not incurred. 
The fact that it is unfair for one to have to save the second child because the 
other person walked away seems like a horrible justification for walking away 
oneself. Multiple Children thus illustrates the directly implausible narcissism 
and pettiness embodied in (GlO), and in this way diminishes its direct plausi-
bility. Consequently, after we have considered Multiple Children, (GlO) seems 
in itself to be a much poorer justification of the alleged permissibility of not 
giving aid in cases like Envelope. 
I believe that this stands in stark contrast to the way our intuitions about 
Envelope conflict with (G9) and the aristocrat's intuition about the permissi-
bility of beating his peasants conflicts with (G8). Our initial intuition that it 
is permissible not to give to aid organizations does not seem to diminish the 
direct plausibility of the idea that we are required to make relatively trivial 
sacrifices to prevent others' suffering serious harm. The case does illustrate 
such things as how (G9) will make demands on us, but none of these things 
seem to diminish (G9)'s direct plausibility. This, I think, is why it seems like 
self-serving rationalization to be more hesitant to accept (G9) in light of its 
implications about Envelope.13 Similarly, our aristocrat's intuitions about 
the permissibility of beating his peasants did nothing to diminish the direct 
plausibility of the idea that such things as who someone's parents were and 
one's aesthetic properties per se are irrelevant to our moral reasons not to harm 
him. Those intuitions do show how (G8) conflicts with many of his assump-
tions, but they do not seem to reveal anything inherently implausible about 
(G8)'s points regarding the lack of plausible connection between who some-
one's parents were and how cool he is on the one hand and the morality of 
inflicting harm on him on the other. This, I think, is why the Aristocrat's 
abandoning (G8) in light of its implications about beating his peasants looks 
like his allowing his uncritical prejudices to overwhelm what critical scrutiny 
has taught him. 
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6 Conclusion 
I have thus argued that, while case-intuitions can help suggest and clarify 
the content of principles, it is the direct plausibility of the principles, once so 
proposed and clarified, that must be taken as foundational. To rest content 
with less directly plausible principles simply because they better fit our case-
intuitions would be to side with our less critically informed prejudices over 
our more critically informed determinations. We would be like slaveholders 
or aristocrats who found the direct plausibility of the ethical relevance of race 
or class questionable on reflection, but concluded that these factors must be 
relevant because they influence their case-intuitions. We are of course con-
fident that our unreflective responses tend to be more reliable than those of 
these characters. But we cannot justify this confidence simply by claiming that 
we were raised in what we regard as "more enlightened" societies if our sole evi-
dence for the greater enlightenment is that our societies' ethical views better 
comport with our unreflective responses. Moreover, just like the slaveholder 
and aristocrat, we cannot know which features of our intuitive responses still 
constitute unenlightened prejudices until we gain the enlightenment of seeing 
whether they can be justified by principles that seem most directly plausible 
after we have fully clarified their content. 
Most philosophers working in normative and practical ethics acknowledge 
that ethical principles should be directly plausible. But it is extremely common 
to see much effort devoted to investigating what principles fit our case-intu-
itions and relatively little effort devoted to determining whether these prin-
ciples are directly plausible - let alone most directly plausible - upon careful 
inspection of what they are really saying. In some respects a good deal of atten-
tion to the question of which principles are suggested by our case-intuitions 
makes perfect sense, as this may be the only.way to discover the principles that 
ultimately prove most directly plausible. But if ethicists wish, as surely they do, 
not only to generate candidate principles but to actually defend substantive 
conclusions, I believe that many of them need to spend a bit more energy on 
the tasks of (i) explaining what directly plausible ideas are embodied in their 
principles, and (ii) showing these ideas to be more directly plausible than their 
rivals after we have gotten as clear as possible about precisely what they are 
saying.14 
Notes 
1. While I speak freely of ethical facts and truths, I am not assuming the truth of cog-
nitivism. I am assuming only that if non-cognitivism is true, it is a sufficiently quasi-
realist version so as to allow me to speak coherently of ethical facts and truths in 
some m inimal sense, in which to call something an ethical fact or truth is to express 
some non-cognitive attitude. 
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2. For this reading of Sidgwick, see Singer (1974a) and Hurka (2014). In addition to 
Sidgwick. and Ross, Hurka identifies G.E. Moore and H.A. Prichard as subscribers to 
this approach. 
3. Of course, the slaveholder might actually infer (G2) from her intuitions about other 
cases - for instance about how it is permissible to treat various individuals who 
are not slaves - before inferring (P2) from (G2). Jn section 5, I consider two very 
different ways of "inferring" general principles from case-intuitions, and argue that 
while we may use case-intuitions to suggest principles and clarify their content, we 
should treat the direct plausibility of principles - once so suggested and clarified - as 
foundational. My primary aim at this point is simply to argue against the radical 
anti-theoretical view that we need not invoke general principles at any stage in our 
basic ethical reasoning. 
4. Slaveholders presumably did not think slaves Jess intellectually able than this, lest 
they think them unfit for performing the tasks set to them. Moreover, the bans on 
teaching slaves to read and write would have been superfluous if slaveholders had 
not thought them capable of these abilities. 
5. Of course, if our slaveholder's daughter has typical intellectual abilities, she might 
have correspondingly lesser intellectual ability than Newton but not lesser intel-
lectual ability in an absolute sense. But we could imagine our slaveholder to have 
already thought about such things as the arbitrary nature of setting a baseline for 
protected intellectual ability at our absolute level as opposed to Newton's. 
6. Dancy (2013, §7) even suggests that according to some anti-theorists, (P3) and (P4) 
may both be in good order, even if one cannot point to a relevant difference between 
them. I am not sure if Dancy means to endorse this last suggestion, but it seems to 
be a glaringly unacceptable way of allowing people to shelter their uncritical preju-
dices from critical scrutiny. 
7. These other issues seem primary in some of Dancy's (2004, 2013) discussions, as 
well as those of Diamond (1991) and Hursthouse (1996). 
8. Diamond (1991, 301- 4) considers the question "how else can we judge the strength 
of a moral view [except by argument]," and asserts that it is "not an unanswerable 
question." But her answer seems extremely evasive. She suggests that "the shoddy 
thought can be shown up by being placed alongside the genuine," but if after such 
placing we are uncertain which thought is genuine, or wish to explain why, I see 
no substitute for careful analysis and argument. She also suggests that "a work may 
[by means other than philosophical argument] invite the reader to elaborate and 
develop a way of looking and to respond critically to it then as a possibility." This 
seems very similar to my suggestion that the arts can be a source of ethical ideas 
that we can go on to critically evaluate. It is, however, unclear how the most careful 
critical evaluation can take place except by means of philosophical arguments that 
seek to determine which general proposals about the relevance of some factors as 
against others are most directly plausible once we have made them as precise and 
clear as possible. 
9. As Parfit (2011) observes, while some authors are willing to be error theorists about 
morality in particular, the epistemological and metaphysical considerations that 
lead to such error theory seem equally to support error theory about all practical 
reasons, and indeed a kind of self-defeating error theory about epistemic reasons. 
10. I understand the category of ethics broadly, to include judgments about what there 
is practical reason for us to do. Even if one is inclined to use the word 'ethics' more 
narrowly, the epistemic and methodological issues seem to be the same when it 
comes to questions about what there is basic practical reason to do. 
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11. Examples of this may include McMahan's (1993, 279; 2013, 115) attitudes towards 
principles like the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing [DDA] (that there are much 
stronger moral reasons against doing harm than allowing harm) and the Doctrine 
of Double Effect [DDE] (that there are much stronger moral reasons against doing 
or allowing harm as a means than as a side-effect). He seems to concede that these 
principles, once carefully clarified, have less plausibility than the view that the 
prevention of serious harm outweighs the importance of such factors as doing vs. 
allowing and means vs. side-effects. I am not sure if he proposes to retain the DDA 
and DDE even if all future attempts to show them to be more plausible fail, but If 
he is, these would be particularly explicit examples of a philosopher retaining what 
he regards as less plausible principles because they better fit his case-intuitions.(In 
McMahan's case there does seem to be another strand of argument, namely that 
unless we accept something like the DDA or DDE we cannot be said to be accepting 
a moral view. But, as Smart (1956) observed, the main thing most of us care about 
in ethics is determining what there is basic reason to do, and we do not particularly 
care whether the reasons we identify get called 'moral'. In any event I cannot think 
of any reasons that have a better claim on being distinctively moral than funda-
mental reasons of beneficence to promote the well-being of others. How could one's 
simply coming to think of reasons of non-maleficence as a species of such reasons 
(viz. to promote others' well-being passively, by not decreasing it) entail that one 
has ceased to think in moral terms?) 
12. Singer did not actually speak of relative triviality but of 'comparable moral 
importance' and 'no moral importance', which I think are more opaque. But I 
believe that, somewhere between Singer's two explicit formulations, (G9) was essen-
tially intended as the logically weaker idea on which his argument depends. The 
logically stronger idea, on which the bulk of Singer's argument does not depend, 
is that if you can prevent serious harm by incurring anything less than a roughly 
equal harm to yourself, it is wrong not to do so. I do not believe that this principle 
has much if any direct plausibility at the outset of inquiry. If it is true, its truth can 
only be established by the kind of detailed undermining of the initial direct plausi-
bility of agent-centered ideas of the kind undertaken by Kagan (1989) and Bennett 
(1995). 
13. The mere fact that one is inclined to reject a principle upon seeing certain of its 
implications, which would be contrary to one's interests, is insufficient to make the 
inclination seem like self-serving rationalization. For instance, being more inclined 
to reject the view that intellectual ability per se affects one's rights because of what 
it would imply about Isaac Newton's rights to enslave you would not seem like such 
rationalization. 
14. This chapter has benefitted from discussions over the years with too many people 
to remember or name. I am particularly grateful to John Ku, Alastair Norcross, and 
David Plunkett for especially helpful and formative discussions, and to Chris Daly 
for very helpful feedback on an earlier draft. 
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